Exposing A Crooked Little Game in The Senate and at The UN

Marching With Jefferson?

"According to the President, the thousands of young Americans now in Vietnam are 'marching with Jefferson'."
—Baltimore Sun *from El Toro, Cal., November 1.*

Marching with Jefferson—in defense of an Asian military regime which gags the press, rigs its elections and still holds under arrest without charges the peace candidate who came in second for President last September? Marching with Jefferson—under an American President who broke his election pledge not to get us into a land war in Asia, who embarked on that war without consulting Congress, who is making unquestioning support of that war a test of loyalty and threatening to induct into the Army any young men who dare to oppose it? Is this marching with Jefferson—or steadily away from him?

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All We Ask of the Viet Cong Is Their Surrender

Ambassador Goldberg's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nov. 2 created the impression that the United States had softened its position toward the National Liberation Front and taken a new step toward a negotiated settlement. The truth, as will be seen when the printed record is available, is that this was another in the many phoney peace performances of the Johnson Administration. It will be seen that we are asking nothing less than the disarming and demobilization of the Viet Cong as the price of peace.

The New Pre-Condition

If anything, the U.S. attitude toward the NLF has hardened. On Jan. 31, 1966, Goldberg submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire in Vietnam and "immediate discussions without preconditions." The new UN resolution he made public for the first time at the November 2 hearing would have the Security Council lay down as a pre-condition, "That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North and South Vietnam *other than those under control of the respective governments,* and all other troops and personnel should be withdrawn or *demobilized* [emphasis added]." Though Goldberg read the text of both resolutions to the Committee, no Senator called attention to this vital difference between them. It was not until the hearing was almost over that Pell of Rhode Island asked Goldberg—

Would it be conceivable in your view that that portion of South Vietnam which is under Communist discipline or Viet Cong discipline would willingly drop its weapons and demobilize while those portions which are under the Thieu government's regime maintain their weapons?

Goldberg never answered the question. He said, "This is what the Geneva Accords in our view provide."

No one asked Goldberg whether he thought there was any chance at all of the Security Council underwriting any such preposterous and one-sided a condition for a settlement. Even the earlier resolution, as Goldberg admitted in his opening statement to the Committee, had obtained the necessary nine votes for inscription on the agenda of the Security Council only "on the understanding [as Goldberg said] that the Council would not proceed forthwith to consider the matter substantively." Three weeks later Matsui of Japan, then President of the Council, shelved the U.S. resolution altogether, reporting "a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time." The fact is, as Goldberg well knows, that no one at the UN takes seriously the idea of UN intervention. Neither North Vietnam nor Communist China, as non-members, will accept the jurisdiction of the UN. Only a reconvened Geneva conference can be the forum for a negotiated settlement. The Jan. 31, 1966, resolution was seen at the UN as an attempt to divert attention from U.S. unwillingness to accept U Thant's 3-point plan for peace, which called for unconditional cessation of the bombing in the North as the necessary first step toward negotiations.

Goldberg disclosed at the November 2 hearing that the new UN resolution was prepared last September "largely at the initiative of Senator Mansfield and Senator Morse." One wonders why they would lend themselves to this empty charade. Goldberg admitted in his prepared statement that a "recent canvass once again shows a general unwillingness for

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A Question Rusk Would Rather Not Discuss

Sen. McCarthy (D. Minn.): The consideration of whether you would withdraw is limited to what might happen in Vietnam. Does this have reference to other parts of southeastern Asia or not?

Amb. Goldberg: We are also very interested in observance of the 1962 accords in Laos, very much so. We would like the Laos accord to be complied with.

Sen. McCarthy: Where would this leave us in the light of what the Secretary of State said in his rather well-publicized press conference of October 12 when he talked about the threat of a billion Chinese with nuclear weapons to all Southeastern Asia and beyond that to the U.S. itself? Are we going to leave this critical area open to a billion Chinese if the question of South Vietnam should be settled within the limits you have defined or not?

Amb. Goldberg: I think that question ought to be addressed to the Secretary of State.

Sen. McCarthy: All right, I will ask the Secretary.

Sen. Pell: When?

Sen. Morse: Where? (Laughter)

—Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nov 2.

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the Security Council either to resume its consideration of the agenda item and draft resolution which we proposed in early 1966, *or to consider the new draft, or to take any other action on the matter.*" [Emphasis added.] At the UN the whole idea is a dead duck. There the new resolution is made the more distasteful by the recollection of the proposal Goldberg put forward in his address of Sept. 22, 1966, to the UN Assembly. Then he said that the U.S. was prepared to accept "a time schedule for the supervised withdrawal of all *external forces* [emphasis added]—those of North Vietnam as well as those from the U.S." Now Goldberg is asking the UN to require not just the withdrawal of the Northern forces but the disarming of the indigenous Southern Viet Cong as a precondition for peace.

G.O.P. Hawks Reassured

That earlier speech by Goldberg proved to be tricky and disingenuous in its use of the term "external forces". It was assumed that this referred to the North Vietnamese. This assumption was strengthened by a speech a few days later (Oct. 12, 1966) in which Secretary Rusk said that if the invaders from the North were withdrawn, the "indigenous element" in the Viet Cong would be "well within the capacity of the South Vietnamese to handle." Laird of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Republican Conference, was so alarmed by the Goldberg speech that he wrote a letter to Secretary McNamara six days later asking whether the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been sought before the speech was made and what was "the current estimate of the Joint Chiefs regarding the ability of the South Vietnamese Army to cope with Viet Cong elements which apparently would be free to continue the war." The reply, almost a month later, from McNamara's office, said the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been sought on this latter question because "the Department of Defense believes Ambassador Goldberg's speech includes the intent that Viet Cong military units would be deactivated in any proposed withdrawal of external forces from North Vietnam." * It is against this background that one should read the phrase "all other troops . . . should be withdrawn or demobilized" in the new UN resolution and the phrase which follows "and all other military bases abolished as quickly as possible and in accordance with an agreed time schedule." The U.S. would withdraw from its bases in South Vietnam only after the Viet Cong had laid down its arms. This is what the UN was asked to ratify.

*** Little attention was paid to this exchange of letters when it was finally made public by Laird. Their text was published in this Weekly for Nov. 7, 1966.**

The Propaganda Ploy

Sen. Aiken: I think it is perfectly obvious that there is a substantial percentage of the UN members who think that the U.S. is to blame, and wholly to blame, for the war going on in Southeast Asia, and what I wanted to ask you next is if we take this matter to the Security Council and indicate beyond a doubt that we want a political settlement of this trouble, would that in your opinion change the minds of any of these countries that now think the U.S. alone is to blame, assuming that our efforts are blocked by other countries, other members, particularly Russia or France.

Amb. Goldberg: I think it would be helpful.

—Before Senate Foreign Relations Nov. 2.

Perhaps one reason the committee let Goldberg get away with this comedy is that so many Senators, like the Administration itself, are using appeal to the UN as a way to make it look as if they are for peace. No less than 55 members of the Senate are sponsoring S. Res. 180 by Mansfield. This empty piece of fluff merely expresses "the sense of the Senate that the President consider taking the appropriate initiative through his representative at the UN to assure that the U.S. resolution of January 31, 1966, or any other resolution of equivalent purpose be brought before the Security Council for consideration." *

Even Morse, though not a co-sponsor, has endorsed the Mansfield resolution while introducing a UN resolution of his own, S. Con. Res. 44. His discussion with Goldberg at the hearing leads one to fear that he is shifting from a critic of Johnson on the war to a collaborator. Morse said that he had discussed taking the war to the UN with Goldberg after his appointment as Ambassador and then again at the time of "the steel case" when they were both at the White House "and the President asked us to talk about it further." Morse said he endorsed the Mansfield resolution because "I thought it was important that we build a bridge between the Congress and this Administration in trying to resolve some of these foreign policy differences." Morse declared that many

*** The co-sponsors, beside Fulbright, Bobby Kennedy, McCarthy, McGovern, Hartke, Church, Aiken, Clark, Cooper, Morton, Pell, and Young of Ohio, all of whom should know better, includes Anderson, Bartlett, Bayh, Boggs, Brewster, Brooke, Burdick, Byrd of W. Va., Cannon, Carlson, Case, Ervin, Griffin, Harris, Hart, Inouye, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Teddy Kennedy, Lausche, Long of Missouri, Metcalf, Mondale, Monroney, Montoya, Moss, Muskie, Nelson, Pastore, Pearson, Prouty, Proxmire, Randolph, Ribicoff, Spong, Symington, Talmadge, Tydings, Williams of N.J., Yarborough, Young of North Dakota and a hawk like Tower of Texas whose willingness to co-sponsor this "peace move" shows how meaningless it is.**

The Administration's Foremost Authority on Southeast Asia In Action

Saigon—Vice President Humphrey showed flawless political finesse when he adroitly sidestepped a loaded invitation to comment on South Vietnam's biggest and sorest internal problem—government corruption. But the Humphrey magic failed badly later at a protocol-stiff diplomatic gathering when he mixed up a couple of kings and presidents . . . Going up to the Laotian delegate, Prince Outhong Souvannavong, chairman of the Laotian Royal Council, Humphrey inquired enthusiastically: "And how is your wonderful President?" The Prince was momentarily taken aback, hesitated and then replied, "But Mr. Humphrey, we still have our king you know." A moment later Humphrey said almost the same thing to the Thai delegate—who similarly was compelled to point out that Thailand, too, was still a monarchy. Unabashed, Humphrey tried it again with Foreign Minister Narciso Ramos of the Republic of the Philippines—and finally hit the jackpot.

—John Randolph in the Los Angeles Times *Oct. 31.*

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people did not know that Johnson had favored UN intervention "from the very beginning" and "has always welcomed *appropriate* [our italics] UN participation and intervention in trying to seek a peace in Southeast Asia." In this, as in hailing Goldberg's statement to the Committee as "historic", Morse made himself a partner in deception.

Morse's own resolution is very different from Mansfield's. Morse's would direct the President to ask the UN Security Council to end the war in Vietnam, "pledging the U.S. in advance to accept and carry out any decision on the matter by the Council." But there is—as Morse should know better than anyone else—not the slightest chance that Johnson would accept a UN Security Council decision. On the contrary, as the new U.S. resolution at the UN shows, we are not even willing to let the Security Council act without tying its hands by making it accept our own preconditions, preconditions which require a Viet Cong surrender.

Goldberg's Evasive Language

The supposed concession to the NLF which made the headlines never appeared in Goldberg's statement at all. It came up under questioning by Gore, who is not a co-sponsor of the Mansfield resolution and subjected Goldberg to the only thorough grilling that he got (see bottom of p. 3). Gore wanted to know what the position of the U.S. would be about inviting the NLF to participate in a Security Council discussion. Goldberg said "we would not stand in the way . . . We would not prevent it from happening." Gore wanted to know what would happen if there were eight votes for the invitation, would the U.S. supply the necessary ninth vote? Again Goldberg was unwilling to give a direct answer. "Well," was all he would say, "in light of the statements I have filed with you, Senator, the U.S. would not initiate an invitation. But if the Security Council, there was a feeling in the Security Council that they ought to be invited we would join in that invitation." That does not say we would supply the missing vote. *

As for the NLF's position at a Geneva conference, Goldberg said in answer to a question by Symington that "we would recognize the competence of the conference to decide the invitees, the scope and to enter into resolution of any disputed question of interpretations." At a State Department press conference next day, however, it was made clear that this did not mean we would actually accept the decisions of a Geneva conference on disputed questions. "Just for clarification," State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey was asked, "you said, quoting the Ambassador, that the U.S. government would accept the judgment of the conference. Concerning what? Concerning the invitation or the participation? Or concerning the whole question?" This followed—

A. Participation and—
Q. Only?
A. —and the form that participation would take.
Q. So this statement is restricted only to the participation, that the U.S. would accept judgment.
A. That's right.

Even the willingness to have the NLF participate was considerably attenuated by Goldberg's only other reference to the

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*** The invitation wouldn't be worth much anyway since groups or individuals invited to present their case under Rule 39 have no vote.**

Hush-Hush Briefings Behind Closed Doors

"Those of you who have attended briefings held by the State Department or the Defense Department know the pattern. You are instructed by the briefer to be sure to keep the information to yourself because you are going to be allowed into the inner holy-of-holies of the information establishment. The presentation is labelled 'Top Secret' so you listen intently to what is being said and always waiting to hear that bit of news that is so hush-hush, but it doesn't come; and when you ask questions, the answers are classics of evasion and marvels of end runs. You leave the meeting wondering how the briefers could think you could be so stupid to think you have been thrilled with the information you have received from them, trying to figure out what's new, what has been said you don't already know, and then you stop at a newsstand to read the paper and you get a more complete and detailed account than you heard in the secret briefing. Actually, insofar as Vietnam is concerned, we in Congress have no information that is not available to you."

—From a speech by Rep. Schadeberg (R. Wis.), inserted in the Congressional Record Nov. 7.

Gore Shows How Johnson and Goldberg Misread the Geneva Accords

Sen. Gore (D. Tenn): In order that I put the point, I refer to a speech which President Johnson made before the Tennessee General Assembly in March of this year and I quote: "We believe that the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central element of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide in essence that both South and North Vietnam should be free from external interference while at the same time they would be free INDEPENDENTLY to determine their position on the question of reunification." [Emphasis added.]

Now that seems to be the position which both you and the President and the State Department have consistently taken. Yet I do not find it, as the President has said, in accord with the Geneva Agreement. Let me read you this, this is the final declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954: "The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." . . . Yet you and President Johnson refer to the two political entities acting independently. This . . . appears to be a contradiction.

Ambassador Goldberg: . . . What I am saying is that under the Geneva Accords as we understand them, and we have not heard Hanoi dispute this, there would be an election in the South as to whether they want to be reunified . . . (and) there would be an election in the North . . . If the two peoples North and South decide they want to be reunified we would not interpose any barriers.

—Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nov. 2.

So the Thieu-Ky government, which has just come to power through rigged elections, would run the election in the South to determine whether the people wanted reunification! The new U.S. resolution at the UN does provide for "international supervision of the foregoing through such machinery as may be agreed upon." But how effective that might be is problematical.

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The Simple Reply the State Dept. Declined to Give

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NLF's role and by McCloskey's gloss on it next day. Toward the close of the hearing Senator Pell told Goldberg, "I think we have made a great step forward in my mind here today in the assertion of our willingness, if necessary, to deal with it [the NLF], not deal with, but negotiate with the representatives of the NLF." Goldberg's reply was "Well, I think the President has frequently said that is not an insurmountable problem, *and I was repeating it in that context.*" [Italics added.] But in that context the U.S. has never said it was ready to *negotiate* with the NLF. The President's exact words as quoted by McCloskey at the State Department next day were from the speech of July 28, 1965, in which Johnson said, "The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides to cease her aggression." McCloskey said Goldberg's statement was to be read in the light of that Presidential declaration. The colloquy that followed left the matter murky:

Q. Bob, to clarify the business of the relationship with these statements to previous ones in your statement. The emphasis—at least in private—has always been that the Viet Cong participation and the presentation of VC views would be through Hanoi, the North Vietnamese delegation. Is that what Mr. Goldberg means?

Mr. McCloskey: Look, I'm just not going to add to the multiplication of language on this subject. I've made an effort to clarify . . .

Q. Are you clarifying or reiterating what he said?

A. Both.

Q. You did a better job at the latter than the former.

The simple, the clarifying, answer would have been that Goldberg meant the U.S. was now prepared to accept direct NLF participation if the conference so decided. Mr. McCloskey was unwilling to give that answer.

> **Sen. Pell: I think the record should show very clearly that every witness who has come here on this [Mansfield] resolution [to refer the Vietnam war to the UN Security Council] has specifically stated that the resolution did not have a Chinaman's chance or to use more diplomatic words to that effect unless there was a cessation of the bombing.**
>
> *—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nov. 2.*

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